

— **PANEL THREE** —

*Vision for the Future*

# — INTRODUCTION OF — THIRD PANEL

*Edward Weiss*  
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**M**y name is Ed Weiss and I'm JINSA's National Secretary. It is my pleasure to moderate the next panel on a "Vision for the Future." Our first speaker is Dr. Gal Luft and he is the executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. The second speaker will be Lieutenant Colonel Behram Sahukar, from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in India. And our third speaker of the panel will be Ms. Juli MacDonald, an associate at Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. specializing in research of political, economic, energy, and military trends in Eurasia, South Asia and Asia Pacific.

**Dr. Gal Luft**  
*Executive Director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security*

I think that nothing is more heartening than the possibility of Israel having one billion friends on her side. And a lot of us are, when we look into the future, tend to be a little bit overly optimistic about the potential of these relations to the extent that sometimes we under-estimate the difficulties that lie ahead.

So without turning myself into the most unpopular man in the room, I would like to talk about the future of these relations and look at the potential but also look at the problems here and try to get a sort of realistic approach of what can be done in the years to come. And I will try to focus on the long run, rather than what's going to happen tomorrow morning.

As you know, there are a lot of similarities between the two countries, which I don't need to repeat here. There are, both in terms of being democracies, fighting terrorism, dealing with Islamic fundamentalism, etcetera, etcetera. There is one thing that people tend to ignore because it's a rather sensitive issue: both countries have almost 20 percent Muslim minorities in their midst. In Israel, you have about, roughly, 20 percent of the population is Arab and in India a similar percentage, and that creates issues because it is from this population that trouble can start. And you have always the problem balancing the need to treat the population as equal, treat them because most of them are loyal, hardworking, tax-paying citizens. But at the same time, their Muslim

affiliation could turn them into or lead some of them, a very, very small percentage, but, you know, when you talk about these numbers, you don't need more than a handful, to lead them in some subversive action.

There are also a lot of differences, and I think the most important difference is the scale. We need to realize here, and it's important, Israel's territory is one-half of a percent of India's. Israel's population is one-half of one percent of India's. You know, Israel, you're talking about six million people. India produces six million people in three months. So the scale of differences are enormous, and that makes Israel a much more vulnerable society.

Just to kind of give you – we're talking about two countries fighting a war on terror. More people were killed in India in the past five years due to terrorism than in all of Israel's wars since the 1948 war. So India, the scale is completely different, and, at the same time, because Israel is such a close society, such a small society, people feel much more vulnerable if there is a terror attack and 20 people die somewhere. Everybody knows somebody who knows somebody, you know. It gets you personally.

And the scale also means that the country is, as someone said before, is a one-bomb country. India is not a one-bomb country. If a bomb goes off, a nuclear bomb goes off in Delhi or in Agra or in Varanasi or in Calcutta, India will survive. If a bomb goes off in Tel Aviv or in

Jerusalem, the devastation is – we don't even want to think about the result. So these are differences that shape public policy, they shape national strategy, and they shape the minds of the people.

There are, in the field of terrorism, also quite important differentiations that need to be made. The countries from which terrorism Israelis deal with, the country from which they emanate are primarily Iran and Syria. These two countries are countries that share positive relations with India, especially Iran now when India becomes very dependent on energy that comes from Iran, and we'll talk about it later. Whereas terrorism that India is facing emanates from Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, those countries.

So we're dealing with two different centers that produce terrorism, and, at the same time, we know that gradual globalization of terrorism, you know, has provided a broad platform for close cooperation between countries and the one thing that we'll see, hopefully, more and more is in the field of cooperation on information sharing because, for Israel, because it is so intimately involved in its own neighborhood, it needs to have somebody supporting in the other neighborhood. It's very difficult for a small country to send its tentacles in the intelligence world to far places, like Pakistan and Central Asia; they're very important. This is one area in which India can help Israel, especially in those area that Israel find it very hard both in terms of operational capabilities and financial capabilities to sustain a worldwide intelligence operation and can give it well, good, high-quality information from these areas.

Israel can give the Indians in return also some good stuff in terms of intelligence. Now, one thing that's interesting, the Indian terrorist groups, by and large, most of them are opposed to suicide bombings. Some of those people who send terrorists to attack military barracks or civilian targets, some of them know that there are no, the chances of survival are very small. But, yet, you don't see the same extent of grue-

some operation of people going out and blowing themselves up. This might change, and I think we'll see it's a successful technique.

We see that terrorists have really done a lot to perfect this strategy, and we may be able to see, I hope I'm wrong, but more and more of this. And that's how to deal with suicide bombing, how to deal with and analyze the mindset of a suicide bomber. It's something that Israel has done a lot of work on it, and it's a very complex issue. But I think that there's a lot of information exchanged that can be very useful to both sides.

Another field of cooperation that I think that the two countries can share a lot in common is in the field of border security. Both countries share long borders with enemy territories from which on either side you have camps that you see terrorists coming out of these camps and try to infiltrate. Both countries have recently built a fence to defend their territory, prevent infiltration of terrorists.

You know that one thing is to build a fence and another thing is to defend a fence. And it takes a lot of, you know, doctrine of how do you defend a fence is very important for the success of the fence concept. Technology. Israeli is a leader in the world in terms of border technology, surveillance equipment. Countries all over the world buy Israeli technology, specifically the one that produces the electric fences and those special sensors along these fences. So the border military equipment I think that Israel is producing today is perhaps the best in the world, and that's a growth industry. And when you build hundreds of miles of fence you need to think how you protect this fence and what do you buy, and this is something that I think we can definitely offer the Indians.

I'm not going to talk about weapons. Just in the headline, a lot is going on in this field and a lot will go on in this field. India has a lot old platform that can be upgraded. There's no need to replenish your entire arsenal. You can really do a lot in terms of upgrading co-production, et-cetera. And that has been going on throughout every sector of the weapon industry, from fast

attack boats to fire control radars, surveillance systems, UAV, assault rifles, artillery shells, everything in this industry I think you could see that there is some sort of collaboration and very, very mutually beneficial deals.

There are other sectors in which I think we could see very close cooperation in the future. Let me just throw a few. Cyber security, big emerging market in which Israel and India could share a lot in common. Both Israel and India have very fast-growing communication. The market grows very fast, and I think that the vulnerabilities are always required to think one step ahead and put your finger in the wall before something befalls on you.

Space, another domain in which we could anticipate Israel has had some very big success in terms of space technologies. And I would not rule out collaboration, some sort of collaboration on the nuclear issue, even though Israel is still a, you know, very different, in a very different position publicly with regards to its nuclear program. But there is a nuclear program, as you know, and I think that what we are likely to see very soon, as the Middle East becomes a nuclear zone, and somebody mentioned before that Iran would soon become a nuclear power. We need to begin to think about the next phase, about second strike capabilities because India already faces a nuclear power, and Israel will be facing a nuclear power and maybe even more. And that will require some thinking out of the box. How do you deal with a nuclearized neighborhood?

Another field I see that both countries can share a lot in common is in the field of critical infrastructure protection. A lot of us hear all the time about Islamic terrorism, but since I run an energy security think tank, we hear that most of the attacks against energy infrastructure are not happening in Kashmir, they're happening in Assam by separatists there and blowing up pipelines and grid and generation facilities, etcetera. But, you know, when you start looking at critical infrastructure, there is a lot that goes into it and a lot that can be done

to increase security in these very, very high-value targets.

Another rather sensitive issue that I think that the two countries can share a lot is, you know, both countries, as much as they face external threats by subversive element, also have a problem. Let's face it, both Israel and India have a problem with nationalism, radical nationalists. And if you talk to people in the Israeli Shin Beth, they will tell you that the main focus today is how to prevent an assassination of the Prime Minister. India has lost more than once its political leadership due to political assassinations. Israel has faced this once. I hope it's the last time. But VIP protection, internal security, dealing with internal operation of nationalist elements within your society is also a growth industry.

So you see that almost in every aspect of security, you have a lot of ground for cooperation, and I think that we will see that the two countries find a lot in common. The question is how deep this and how enduring these relations can become. And I feel that this is the key question here because those type of collaborations require trust, require an understanding that we're both on the same side, we're both fighting for a similar set of values, and we both share the same picture of the world in terms of who's my friend and who's my enemy.

The problem is that we are beginning to see a stage in which Israeli and Indian interests are beginning, unfortunately, to diverge. And the reason is that if you look at India as a country that grows at five percent a year, and when I look at the economic projections I see five percent per year over the next 20 years. That's pretty much what is forecasted. That will require India to ensure steady flow of energy, primarily in the field of oil and gas.

India is poor in oil and gas. It needs a lot of it. It has very little. And the only places that can provide oil and gas right now to India are the Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. And it is no secret that the Arabs don't want Israel and India to be in

bed together. They don't want those relations to flourish, and they want Indians to be dependent on them. They want to make sure that India is beholden to their oil.

Today as it is 70 percent of India's oil is imported, and most of it is from the Middle East. We have made some projections that show that within 20 years almost all of India's oil will be imported from, all imports will be imported from the Middle East. Part of it is because geography puts India in an awkward position that, unlike China that can really stretch some oil from Siberia, India is kind of locked in between. And the closest place that India can reach out and get its oil is from the Persian Gulf.

And, you know, unfortunately, the picture of the energy market is such that we are running out of non-OPEC oil. Reserves in the non-OPEC world are being depleted twice as fast as reserves in OPEC countries in the Middle East. According to the International Energy Agency and other reputable organizations, in 30 years OPEC will control 90 percent of the world's oil reserves.

It means that, in the long run, India will be completely beholden to the Arabs. And I just don't see how that allows close intimate relations when your energy sources come from countries that are not likely to be friends with Israel. That will put the relations under some sort of strain, unless Israel, the United States, India, and other oil-consuming countries will take drastic measures to change the playing field and to become less dependent on the Middle East. It can be done. It can be done, but it requires an understanding what is at stake and what will be the implications of not doing it.

We have given it some thought. For example, one of the ideas that we came up with is, you know, instead of making India so dependent on the Persian Gulf, why not shift India's oil supply from the Persian Gulf to Russia? And guess who can facilitate it? Israel. You know why? Because one of the ways you can bring Russian, basically the only way you can bring large quantities of Russian oil, and Russia has

a lot of oil reserves, from Russia to India is by taking it through the Black Sea, off-loading it in Ashkelon, sending it through a pipeline that already exists to Eilat, and then Indian tankers can come to Eilat and pick up the oil.

Now, that is one of those win-win-win solutions. Why? Because it makes Israel a hub, an energy hub in which India can begin to buy Russian oil. That means India is less dependent on the Middle East and more dependent on Russia, which is good. Israel can make money through transition fees because, you know, for every barrel of oil you send through a pipeline you can make 40 cents or 50 cents. So for Israel to be something that can generate revenues and millions of dollars every year, good news.

For Russia it will be good because they can diversify their market and send their oil to a very large market, fast-growing market. For America it will be good because it brings together a lot of, you know, all those democracies the more economic relations you have.

So, you know, there are ways. That's only one example. There are a number of examples. But on the other hand, what do we see? We see the exact opposite. India is just signing up probably within the next year and will team up with Iran and Pakistan on a pipeline deal that takes natural gas from Iran to India through Pakistan.

We need to make sure that we see more projects like the one that I described before than what we are seeing today. And that is the challenge here: how to keep India in our camp rather than let it drift into the camp of the oligarchs or the whatever you want to call them of the Middle East, oil monarchies of the Middle East.

If we do this, then I think there is a very, very bright future for these relations. If we neglect to deal with these issues, all the things I described before will not really flourish in the long run. So I think that is the key, the key to the future of India's relations with Israel. Thank you.

*Lt. Col. Behram A. Sahukar*  
*Senior Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses*

Let me say I'm glad to be here with JINSA. I'm happy to say that I was part of the first JINSA meeting in New Delhi in February 2003, and I'm happy to be part of the third, as well. I just retired from the army a little while ago after 34 long years. I've earned my pension, so to speak.

I've been asked to speak on India-U.S.-Israeli security issues and to touch upon future challenges and opportunities. So I intend to cover it in four major headings: What are India's security concerns? What are the points of conflict with Israel and the U.S.? What don't we agree upon? And how can we cooperate in the near or long-term future?

What are our major security concerns? Unfortunately or fortunately, I have to talk about our good friend next door to the west, Pakistan, and the biggest concern that we have today, like Israel and like the U.S., is Pakistan's support to cross border Islamist terrorism against India. Tensions between us, between Pakistan and India, might lead to war, as we have come close to, as you know, in 2003. It was averted at the last moment to the happiness of all.

The third major concern is nuclear proliferation combined with terrorism. In fact, yesterday, The New York Times and last week, the head of the CIA brought up the same concerns, that terrorists are on to the nuclear bomb or a chemical weapon or a biological weapon, sets it off in a city. And the effect that would have

in India and I tend to disagree with the previous speaker – is that the effect would be much more if the conditions are right because of the population density that we have, and the disaster response is much slower than in certain developing countries.

So in India, if someone decided to set off a bomb or a chemical weapon or blow up a chlorine plant in a populated area, and we have a live example in the Bhopal case, which was an accident, and 4,000 people suffered because of that one accident with the Union Carbide plant, and they're still suffering today. They're still blinded and they're deaf, and they're still suffering from the effects of that chemical explosion that took place in the central city of Bhopal almost 20 years ago.

Okay. And the other thing we have to worry about is China. Though our relations, as Ambassador Jassal brought up earlier, have improved with China, we've decided to put the border issue on the backburner. But the other concern that we have is the U.S. confrontation with China over Taiwan might bring a war near to a place where we don't want it to be, unlike the war with Pakistan, which is right in our backyard.

The other concerns we have or divergences relate to our military defense needs and the upgrading of our technology to fight terror and also to safeguard and make India secure. These we consider legitimate, and we were a

little disappointed with Condoleezza Rice's statement about the F-16 sales, the noncommittal answer, as well as Pakistani objections to purchases from Israel and the U.S., that this would upset the balance of power in South Asia. Yet, they want F-16s for their legitimate needs, so to speak.

Then, of course, as someone has already talked about, energy security is a very, very major concern to us. Right now, we import 70 percent of our oil. Very soon it's going to be 85 percent of our oil. Domestic production does not keep up with our expansion both of our defense forces, as well as industrial expansion and the development of our country. So that's a very important aspect. So whatever happens in the region in South Asia or whatever happens in the Middle East directly impinges on India's security concerns.

So just a brief, quick lesson in geography, I would say. This is India. We live in a rough neighborhood. Pakistan to our west. Nepal has a problem with Maoist terrorists, we all know that. Bangladesh has become the next hub of Islamic extremism to our east. One of the Bangladesh's terrorist groups is also a part of the al Qaeda International Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders.

Burma. We have good relations with Burma. It has a military government. China is a sleeping giant that, as Napoleon said, when it wakes, it will shake the world. It has already awakened, and the world is shaking. You go on to Southeast Asia. Mr. Feldman has spoken about terrorism in Southeast Asia. Sri Lanka. We lost one former prime minister due to a suicide bomber from Sri Lanka.

Pakistan. Most of the world has already connected the nuclear proliferation, export of terrorism. We consider Pakistan to be the epicenter of terrorism, unlike, say, Israel or some countries that consider Iran to be the epicenter of terrorism. In fact, Mr. Michael Shearer and Madeleine Albright made the statement some years ago when they said that the center of gravity of terrorism has shifted from the

Middle East to South Asia. And I, as a military officer, fighting terrorists in Kashmir and the northeast tend to agree with that, that the epicenter of terrorism is Pakistan. And it's a Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus. Afghanistan is trying to get back on its feet. The Air Chief Marshal brought it out already. It's a fractured country trying to do its best to become a moderate Muslim country.

Central Asian states. We do not have any concerns of terrorism from the Central Asian states affecting us. Though they are in turmoil and they have Islamic radicalism there, it does not directly affect India. But, yes, the Islamic terrorism in China has some sort of indirect effect on Muslim separatism in Kashmir, as well.

Iran. Now that we've talked about it, I'll come back to it a little bit later, and I'd be happy to answer some questions on this. We go back a long, long way. It may be the new rogue in the Middle East. We go on to the Caucasus, Chechnya, the connection between the Chechen terrorists and the Pakistani terrorist groups. They attend the same training camps. Hamas, LTT, they all go back to training in the Afghan/Pakistan training camps. They have said so in interviews, if you read any of the books that have come out now, *Master Minds of Terror*; I can name any one of them. They go back to the training camps in the Pakistan/Afghanistan area.

UAE. If you go to Dubai today, it's a modern, bustling city, but the UAE, unfortunately, has been a hub of bad people, evil people. Dawood Ibrahim has already made the headlines in the U.S. He's a wanted man now in the United States, as well. The A.Q. Khan/al Qaeda networks seem to have been discussed in the UAE, so this is another problem with us. Unfortunately, the straits of Hormuz that pass between Iran, UAE, Qatar is in a very, very sensitive area.

I'd like to point out a little port here southwest of Pakistan called Gwadar, which is coming up in a very, very big way. Built with Chinese help, it's going to be sitting astride the

energy lanes of most of the developing world and developed world. It is being built ostensibly as an open port for commercial use, but they have not ruled out giving the Chinese expanded navy facilities, military facilities, and this could be the next answer that China has to deal with Russia or the U.S. And this is a very, very important development that most people seem to have missed out on, and we are watching it very, very carefully.

The pipeline that everyone is talking about so far comes from southern Iran here at the Gaza Strip, goes through Pakistan, and comes into India. The Indian Energy Minister has spoken in favor of expanding this pipeline through Myanmar to China. That way, India makes money. Otherwise, the natural gas pipeline terminates only in India. The Iranians and the Pakistanis don't make money. I have the figures here. I can give it out. There's a very good article, actually, in the last issue of *The Economist*, if you want to know something about this. So we are trying to have this pipeline from Iran through Pakistan into India, expanded to Myanmar, and then up north into South China.

I don't want to comment on the previous speaker, but the other way of getting our oil, I think would be a little more expensive. That is, we're talking about crude oil. This is natural gas. We will also offer liquefied natural gas, which is much more expensive, but at the moment, the pipeline will only transport natural gas. The pipeline is in the pipeline.

I think that should be okay. I'll go on to the next, please. This is the area that is causing us the maximum problem from Islamist extremism. I will not say "Islamic." The Ambassador brought this out. It's Islamist extremism, or people who use Islam for their political or militant purposes. This is the famous "line of control," shown here in purple. It's about 740 kilometers long, roughly about 400-plus miles long, because I know I'm speaking to Israelis and Americans, and Americans seem to be a little behind the world in miles and kilometers.

It is really a ceasefire line that was formalized by India and Pakistan in 1972 under the Simla Agreement. It was inspected for many, many years. India has been projecting a point that to resolve the growing Kashmir problem, let's convert this line into an international border. Pakistan keeps what it took by aggression in the 1947, 1948, 1965 wars, and India just has the rest of the state, which legally was acceded, the marriage of the state acceded to India in 1947, the 27th of October, in fact. They signed over the state to the Indian union legally. We know the history of the Kashmir problem.

This is the line of control through which Pakistani-based terrorists who are based here in this camp, with these camps, cross over and cause mayhem in India. I'll show you some photographs later on.

The type of terrain. We talked about terrain under which one has to operate. This is the harshest terrain you can ever think of. The Air Marshal brought out that some of the passes are 23,000 feet high. It was along these passes that, in May 1999, Pakistani-based extremists and the Pakistani regular Army crossed the line of control, occupied these features. Some of them are bare, like this. It's an ice desert. Some of them are snow-clad, like this. In fact, in May, it will be the third anniversary of that operation.

During the winter, they stocked these thickets, and, when the snow melted, the Indian army suddenly found these troops occupying our side of line of control, south of the line of control, in an area called Kargil a year after the nuclear test. We thought that after the nuclear test maybe, you know, nobody would dare to violate an accepted line of control, which was de facto an international border because it was formalized, as I said, in 1972.

And thereafter, we had to approach the U.S. We, of course, launched our own attacks in May 1999. We lost 500 to 600 good young officers and good men trying to attack along these ridgelines. This is not the type of terrain that Israel faces with the Gaza Strip or that Israel faces with Lebanon. It's much more harsh.

And, therefore, we have been using some of the surveillance devices, undetected ground sensors, radars. But some of them do not work in this type of terrain. You must remember that technology can be fooled, and the same technology that works in the deserts of the Gaza Strip or the semi-hilly terrain of the Lebanese-Israeli border or the Sheba Farms area or the Golan Heights do not work in temperatures – or heights of 20 or 18,000 feet or in wet jungles.

Someone said that we don't see the gruesome picture that happened in India. There's one gruesome picture, when one of our airlines, in fact, in December 1999, was hijacked from Katmandu, Nepal to Kandahar, in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. And one passenger was brutally murdered because India failed to negotiate initially. He was brutally murdered and taken off at Dubai, in fact. The plane stopped for a short while in Lahore, then it stopped in Dubai for refueling where this gentleman, Mr. Katyal, was murdered by Pakistani-based terrorists, four of them, who demanded the release of hardcore terrorists that we had held in India.

This is the most important one of them. The one on the right, Maulana Masood Azhar, who then formed on his release – we released three of them, three hardcore terrorists. He and his compadres were also responsible in 1995 and 1993 for the capture and the murder of western tourists in Kashmir, Israeli tourists in Delhi and in Kashmir, who then escaped from the houseboat, actually in Kashmir, three of them. And also the kidnapping of British tourists in Delhi and then taken to Saharanpur. So they're not good people.

Initially, we did not agree to release them, some years ago. But in 1999, in December 1999 and early 2000, we were forced to negotiate and release them, something like what Israel has been forced to do sometimes in the past. Also, the person who released, along with Maulana Masood Azhar, Omar Sheikh, was involved in the murder of Daniel Pearl.

What, actually, what are trying to obtain

the help of the U.S. for? Here we have line of control. What actually happens? What is the jihad factory that someone talked about earlier? You have recruitment, funding, religious madrassas which teach and spew out hate, Islamist extremism, misinterpret the Koran, talk about jihad the world over against India, against the U.S., against Israel because the Hindus, the Jews, and the Christian crusaders all enemies of the true, the straight part of Islam. They are not people of the book, as the Koran has been saying. They misinterpret certain text.

They carry out training. There are two types of training courses: a three-month course and a seven-day course. They all deal with explosives, mayhem, murder, assassination, and infiltration. This formed the jihad factory.

Then you have launch pads based on the western side of the line of control or the northern side of the line of control, depending from where they're coming in. The Pakistani army shares Indian army posts to keep our head down while these launch pads are activated. And known guides, either from the Indian side of the line of control or the Pakistan side, take these groups of terrorists across the line of control, where they come to a rendezvous point, have hideouts within Indian territory, and carry out mayhem, subversion, sabotage, arson, suicide bomb attacks.

So this is what India needs to cut the head of the snake and, so-called, drain the swamp from where these actions take place because, as the General brought out, that is not just the terrorists but the organizations behind it that keep the cycle going. And one country on its own cannot do it. Two minutes? Okay.

Here are some good fast photographs on the infiltration. We talked about the arms that they have. We're not talking about suicide only, suicide vests, or Kassam rockets. We're talking about time-tested weapons, including Stinger missiles, as the Air Marshal brought out. Here is the weapon being shown to the diplomats, a recruitment drive for jihad in Kashmir, unaccounted-for money being collected for terrorist

organizations. I'll skip this part. In short, we are encircled by terror. Okay.

Quickly, since it's two minutes. We have been acting on a self-imposed restraint. We have not used our heavy guns or tanks, as yet, against terrorists. We've also not crossed international borders in pursuit of terrorists. There's been a bit of talk about hot pursuit, attacking training camps using our air force, but India has not been doing that.

We are sensitive to the politico-religious sentiment of the people, and we would prefer to do it by international cooperation. Here are some of the gruesome pictures. Remember that someone said there are no gruesome pictures in India. Another one shows the suicide attack against the Kashmir parliament, and then one on the Indian parliament itself, which was attacked just as the parliament got adjourned. This is one of the suicide bombers, the second one. Here's an attack that was carried out on a temple while pilgrims were praying. Here's the body lying.

After 9/11, India and the U.S. converged on many, many points. So far, India is not aligned. We do not offer any military bases, except maybe stopping-over, refueling bases during the Gulf War. But after 9/11, we were offered the use of air bases, ports, and any of the facilities that the U.S. might require. But we were on the wrong side of geography, and, of course, Pakistan became the favored help.

But all the same, India, the U.S., and Israel came closer in counterterrorism cooperation and in defense ties. But the jihad was proclaimed by Jaish-e-Muhammed, Lashkar-e-Tayiba, Harakat ul-Mujahedin against all three: India, the U.S., and Israel.

Now, the problem that we face is that we are in a no-war, no-peace situation. The army has to function in the dual role of counterinsurgency, as well as conventional operations, as was seen in Kargil. We were fighting an insurgency in Kashmir. Suddenly, we had to bring out our artillery shells, bring out our guns, and attack positions in the mountaintops. The po-

lice and the paramilitary mobilization is slow.

The border management. As I've told you the difference in border management is first of all the length of the borders. Mr. Jassal brought up the 3,000 kilometers, almost 2,000 miles, in China; 1,700 miles against Pakistan, and a 7,000-kilometer coastline. Compare that to what Israel has to do; it's peanuts.

And even if you compare what the U.S. has to do today, you see that the U.S. cannot control its southern border with the Mexican immigrants. We find that 50,000 thousand of them seem to be crossing over monthly, and you can't stop them.

What are other limitations? How do we counter the religious legitimate factor, especially if we have Muslim troops? Because we have Muslim troops in the Indian army. There is a moderate Muslim population. Even if one percent of just 145 million Muslims who were moderate become extremists because of wrong policies or high-handedness or overreaction by the Indian forces or wrong policies, even if one percent or half a percent of 145 million – I'm not good in math – what it comes to is not a very, very comfortable figure.

But so far, as Mr. Jassal brought out earlier, not one Indian has been found in any of the training camps, not one Indian has been held in Guantanamo Bay prison camp, not one Indian shoe bomber has been caught on a plane. Indian Muslims have remained moderate and, of course, today the president of India is a Muslim. The Muslims have commanded our air forces.

And a very funny thing. When we were forced to attack East Pakistan in 1971, the prime minister was a Hindu. The chief of the eastern army, General Aurora, was a Sikh and wore a turban. His chief of staff was a Jew, General J.F.R. Jacob. And the chief of the army staff was a Parsee, a Zoroastrian, what I am. That is 0.055 percent of the population. So you can see what the secular part of India is.

Now, what is left of the security concerns? Nuclear proliferation, China, and energy

security stability in the region. What I'll do is I'll touch upon – I think the point that came up quite often was the energy security aspect and the question of Iran. As I said earlier, we look upon Iran as a strategic friend of India who can provide us our energy needs and does not pose a threat to Indian concerns.

As far as the Arab world is concerned, we want to balance out our views or our policy with Israel with the Arab world for good reason, like the U.S. is doing. And what are we asking from Pakistan or from Musharraf? If you see, if you just have a matrix and you pick off what Pakistan has and what Iran has, it has the same thing: a nuclear capability – Pakistan already has the power. Iran is on the threshold of nuclear capability – supports terrorism, exports terrorism. Israel feels it exports it to the Middle East. Pakistan exports terrorism worldwide. Does it have nuclear proliferation? Yes. The A.Q. Khan network is now well documented.

Is it sort of a dictatorial regime? Does it have a military dictator? It has both. There's no real difference between what we're asking from Pakistan or from the world. It's what was asked from President Arafat or what has been asked from Iran. Hand over the terrorists, stop sponsoring terrorists, dismantle the infrastructure, and become moderate. Get back democracy. We're not asking anything new.

Okay. How can we help? That's the end. We can help in reconstruction of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the future Palestinian state. We have expertise for it. India would have provided troops to Iraq, as well. We are the third largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces. Had the UN flag been flying in Iraq today, the Indian division would have been dead. I know because we were preparing to send them over. We've sent peacekeepers almost all over the world. Today, the military advisor to the Secretary-General is an Indian, Major General Mehta.

So we have a lot of experience in peacekeeping operations, reconstruction, and rehabilitation. We have a lot of experience in training security forces, which we're happy to do

for Afghanistan, for Iraq, anywhere else in the world. In fact, we had a training team in Iraq for a short while.

We would like Israeli and American help to modernize our forces, counter-terrorism cooperation, and intelligence cooperation. As the Air Marshall said, we would like to know everything and not just what you want us to know.

WMD forecasting, as well, is very important to us. We have a lot of experience in this, and also disaster management or response, and to also view the Kashmir problem in the correct perspective. Go back to the history books, find out what is the correct status of Kashmir, and look at it in the correct perspective and assist India, maybe facilitate India to get history right, to have what is correct, what is right to us. And we do not want to break up the secular public of India by giving up a Muslim majority state because it happened to Muslim majority. That's not a good reason. And to work jointly to resolve tensions and instability in the region. Thank you.

*Juli A. MacDonald*  
*Senior Associate, Booz Allen Hamilton*

First, I want to thank Tom Neumann and Armeane Choksi for inviting me to be part of this conference. I will try to be a little bit provocative and look out into the future and think through the dynamics of the India-Israel-U.S. relationship, which I'm going to call the Strategic Triad for short in my talk, in the context of three developments that are likely to shape the future security environment: a rising China, the potential for a nuclear Iran, and stability or instability in Iraq and the Middle East or West Asia writ large. And then I'll end with some observations about how those dynamics, what those dynamics suggest about how we should be thinking about the Strategic Triad, what needs to be done to ensure that there's a firm foundation for the relationships, and a foundation that can endure the future challenges that will inevitably unfold over the next decade.

So I'm going to start with the rising China scenario. China's emergence as a regional and perhaps a global power will be driving and is driving a host of critical strategic dynamics that are reshaping the strategic environment right now, particularly in Asia. The U.S. is going to be confronted with a region that is not accustomed to or that rotates around China in a way that we haven't seen before.

And I think you talked about this morning, but I see the strategic competitions that will be shaping the national security agenda

shifting to the Asia arena, Asia defined broadly from the Middle East all the way across to Japan, from Russia down to Australia. This is where the action is going to be. This is where the problems are going to be.

And for India, the Middle East is West Asia, and it's one end of India's wide range of strategic interests that stretch across this Eurasian land mass. And for the United States, India is an important Asian actor whose interest, whose shared interests in Asia range from promoting regional stability, protecting the ceilings, countering terrorism, containing WMD proliferation and, not least, managing a rising China. And in the context of this Strategic Triad, India, the U.S., and Israel, I see Israel becoming more of an Asian actor. Its security and strategic interests tend to focus on its immediate neighborhood, but this link with India and the United States, who are going to be concerned with a rising China, will pull Israel into an Asian context.

In particular, this India/Israel relationship will naturally draw Israel into a broader strategic context, possibly in Central Asia but also further east. And Israel already plays a major role as a technology supplier in Asia, but its role will likely grow and broaden, but exactly what that role looks like I'm not sure. I don't think it's been determined yet, but I'd be interested in thoughts from the panel and others here. But moreover, Israel also is not

without its other Asian connections that would help bolster the strategic presence of this triad in Asia, particularly Singapore comes to mind in this regard.

But I would posit that in a world in which the U.S. and India are concerned about a rising China and how to maintain influence vis-à-vis China and Asia and beyond, Israel would be faced with the choice. It's not going to be able to sit on the fence between India and the United States on one side and China on the other. If China is perceived to be increasingly assertive, as is the case today and perhaps more menacing, Israel cannot be a friend and a supplier of technology to China but the U.S. is regularly needing to thwart or try to prevent. And I guess this morning we heard that maybe that isn't happening anymore.

But Israel is going to be forced to choose sides. And in ten years, what will be driving that strategic calculus? What kind of actor will China be in the Middle East, given its energy needs and the fact that it's becoming increasingly dependent on the Middle East, as we heard about India? And how might India or China's growing global role affect how Israel makes that strategic calculation?

The second future scenario I'd like to explore is a nuclear Iran, which we've already talked about a little bit in the questions in the last session. But none of the three countries we're talking about today has an interest in seeing Iran develop a nuclear capability. And I'd like to look at two different pathways that pretend different outcomes and challenges for this strategic relationship or triad, given that each country's relationship with Iran is slightly different.

And I'd like to look at, first, if Iran is prevented from going nuclear, and, two, if Iran becomes a nuclear state. First, if Iran is prevented from going nuclear, which perhaps it's already too late, it might be due to actions that the United States or Israel takes, either jointly or individually, some kind of military action. And in this pathway, India is going to have to

decide either to be supportive of the military action against its close friend Iran or to be publicly critical of the action and to stand next to Iran and move away from the United States and Israel.

India would be faced with this important decision-point as to which set of strategic relations are going to be most important. And for India, as we've already heard in great detail, Iran is going to be, is growing in importance in terms of energy, as demonstrated most recently by a multi-billion dollar energy deal, which will link India and Iran in a supply relationship for decades.

In addition, Iran is India's gateway to Central Asia. And Iran, over the next decade, will be criss-crossed with newly built infrastructure to facilitate commerce between India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. And, at the same time, Israel is likely to remain a very important supplier of these high-tech technologies that India can't get anywhere else. And in this context, it's not clear to me what the state of the U.S.-India relationship will be, so I think it will be a very difficult dynamic for the Indians to make this kind of calculation.

And I pose the question: Will the suspicions about Iranian activities undermine the U.S. ability to really build a strategic relationship with India because we can't tolerate this Indian-Iranian relationship. And Secretary Rice was not shy about raising this issue publicly this past week in Delhi.

So in short, a preemptive military strike against Iran could place great strain on India's relationships both with the U.S. and Israel. Second, if you look at the pathway in which no one acts and Iran indeed goes nuclear and demonstrates a credible capability – and as we know, it already has the ability to deliver a weapon – a major conflict is also going to occur at the center of this Strategic Triad.

As we've already heard, for Israel and the United States, a nuclear Iran is a significant threat and perhaps the ultimate threat to their national security. For India, on the other hand,

it's not the other end of the spectrum, but this is a threat. They're worried about it, it will be a threat that they need to pay serious attention to, and they will want to help manage. So what role will they play to help solve this problem?

Therefore, a nuclear Iran raises questions that need to be addressed by each state, such as how would these countries contain a nuclear Iran? What strategies should they be pursuing today? What if the threats in the region put Iran in the position that it considers using this new capability? How would these three states work together or against each other in a post-nuclear use environment? What kind of undertaking might India provide Israel if Iran develops this credible capability? And what kinds of non-traditional, non-proliferation regimes could be established today to contain this problem? And what role would India and Israel play in them? And would the regime provide the strategic glue to keep this triad together?

So these pathways suggest that the current developments in Iran engender a powerful incentive for these three countries to be working together to prevent a nuclear Iran from emerging. Maybe that's not possible, but I think the three countries need to be thinking about what direction do they want Iran to go? What options do they have if Iran goes in the wrong direction or an undesirable direction? And what are the triggers and redlines for action in each state? These questions need to be addressed today before Iran takes a more provocative action.

It's critical that India plays a major role in these discussions, because, indeed, India has a close relationship with Iran. And is this happening today? If it is happening today, I think this is a promising sign for the direction of the Strategic Triad of India, U.S., and Israel. And thinking about this triad through an Iranian filter, in my view, elevates India's strategic importance significantly.

India must be at the table, must be at the table either in the front room as part of the discussions or in the back room as part of the

back channel communications. And I'm not sure if that's taking place or not. I also pose the question: Are India and Israel discussing these kinds of issues, how they would be thinking about a nuclear Iran in the aftermath? And, if so, what role do they envisage for the U.S. in this kind of scenario?

So the third scenario, future scenario, I'd like to explore is the instability or stability of Iraq and West Asia writ large. Over the next decade, we'll see either a modicum of success in Iraq, or we could see cascading failure. And I believe it's fair to assume that what happens in Iraq might have a demonstration effect on others in the region, and that's why the stakes for the United States are so high there, as we all know.

So success in Iraq may portend the broader political reform and economic development in West Asia. And, indeed, if the region moves in this direction, India, along with a lot of other actors, is going to be drawn into West Asia. And as we've heard already, economically, India would likely be a major investor and participant in reconstruction and energy development. Militarily, India will seek a larger role in protecting its energy investments there and human interests. It already has over 3.5 million people in the Middle East and West Asia, and that number is likely to grow significantly if there's more stability in the region. And as we just heard, the Indian military's experience in military training and in peacekeeping equips it to play a major role in continuing to move West Asia on a trajectory of stability.

So India could emerge as a major player in Iran. And as I was thinking through this yesterday writing this, I thought that that would be in Israel's interest. But I heard on the panel today that maybe that wouldn't be in Israel's interest. But I had posited that it would be.

And the role that India plays I think hinges on two things: what role the U.S. would like India to play in the region and how can we facilitate that, and what role is India willing to step up to play? And so my question for the Israe-

lis is, you know, if it's in your own interests to have India as a stabilizing factor in West Asia, what are the Israelis doing today to engage the U.S. in discussions to ensure that India plays a role in the Middle East? Alternatively, is Israel developing strategies to coax India to become more involved, to step up, even if the conditions are relatively uncertain?

So if we have a situation where the experiment in Iraq fails and we see this kind of cascading failure of chaos and instability, I believe the strategic bonds and the rationale for the India, Israel, and the U.S. relationship might be undermined. It might be weakened because a failure in Iraq translates into significant erosion of U.S. prestige and credibility in the region and globally. And under these conditions, it's plausible that India might, not walk away, but might look for other strategic anchorage, Russia, Japan, and Europe, maybe even China as an alternative to the United States.

A diminished U.S. could also leave Israel looking for other actors and other partners to shore up the situation in their immediate neighborhood if the U.S. can't do it, which, in turn, could strengthen the Indo-Israeli relationship and bring other actors into the region. In this context, India and Israel should be focused like an arrow on how to collaborate with the U.S. to ensure success in the region.

Let me just close with a few observations. In all of these future worlds, the Strategic Triad has an important role to play in managing the challenges that will likely shape the future security environment. And leadership in all three countries should be thinking about how this triad can be leveraged, what strategies need to be in place today, and what strategic architecture should be developed to ensure that more desirable worlds, that we all agree with, tend to emerge.

And, in particular, India and Israel need to help create this new architecture. They need to shift, in my view, their modular relationship, which is focused on specific issues, technology transfer, trade, and counter-terrorism efforts,

to a more strategic level. Are these countries thinking about their relationship in a broader context, not just their neighborhood, but in a more global scope? And have they started to think about how they're going to manage the potential significant contradictions in their relationship, particularly with regards to China and Iran?

And for the U.S.'s part, we need to deepen and broaden our relationship with India to make this triad effective. In contrast to the Indo-Israeli relationship, I believe the Indo-U.S. relationship is based largely on broad strategic shared interests and common values and it's less rooted in the specific issues. The foundation for the U.S.-India relationship needs to be bolstered with trade, investment, and not least of all technology transfer.

And India is eager to be treated on par with other U.S. allies, Israel and our European friends. And in my view, the U.S. should oblige India, given the different worlds and challenges that I've described.

And in addition, the U.S. policy-makers and defense-planners need to plan to broaden the strategic context in which we view India. Today, India is viewed primarily through an Asia-Pacific filter and is rarely considered a player in the Middle East and Central Asia. And this thinking is driven primarily by the way we divide up the world. We have the Pacific Command, we have Central Command, and India falls in the Pacific Command area of responsibility.

Consequently, the strategic relationship has a maritime filter. We see India in the context of ceiling protection, in the context of China, and we don't see it in the context of these challenges in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Indeed, the CENTCOM leadership views India more as an irritant than a key player in the scenarios that I've described in this presentation. And since 9/11, CENTCOM leadership repeatedly has complained about India's actions that tend to divert the resources of Paki-

stan and the Pakistani military away from the borderlands, the tribal areas and the border with Afghanistan to Kashmir. So they're not in a state to have the kinds of discussions that they need to with the Indians, and I think we need to solve that problem.

So to take advantage of what I think could be a powerful strategic triad, U.S. policymakers need to start thinking about India in a different way and should be leaving or at least contributing to strategic dialogues on issues and challenges raised by a nuclear Iran, a rising China, and what's happening in the Middle East. And we need to be thinking about how we leverage India and how we leverage the Indo-Israeli relationship to be a force for stability in the Middle East and beyond.

So I will just conclude by saying I think the triad has great potential. It has yet to be tapped. But there are so many tests out there that I think the three states are ill prepared to face until we've established a stronger strategic foundation. So I hope we can start and continue to build that. Thank you.

## — CLOSING REMARKS —

*Mr. Tom Neumann*  
*Executive Director, JINSA*

On behalf of the U.S.-India Institute and JINSA, let me say that one of our purposes here today in dealing with the trilateral relationship is, and I'll quote the slogan of the Syms clothing store chain: "An educated consumer is our best customer." Having said that, I will be brief. I heard a lot of differences, as well as similarities and points of view from the three countries involved in this trilateral relationship. We talked about the UN, China, Iran, Pakistan, and terrorism. I think we were most unified on the kinds of terrorism, but we weren't unified on which is the worst terrorist of all and which is the least worst terrorist of all and where it all emanates from.

But let me just say to you that the relationship is like what they say about democracy. Democracy is the worst form of government there is, except for all the others. Therefore, the relationship between India, Israel, and the United States may not be perfect, but it's the best relationship that can exist, with the exception of all others.

The issue of the U.S., Israel, and India relationship is not an ideal, it's a necessity if we want to see the world in the future the way we do.

Thank you all for being here so long. We hope we imparted something of value, and we hope we can contribute together to the relationship that exists and will grow between the three countries. Thank you.

**— BIOGRAPHIES OF PANEL —  
PRESENTERS**

**The Honorable Rafael Barak** serves as Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C., a position he assumed in August 2000.

Mr. Barak has been a career diplomat at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1977. Prior to his appointment to Washington, Mr. Barak served as Deputy Director-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. In this position, Mr. Barak was the Chief of Staff of the Director-General's Bureau, as well as Head of the Coordination Division. He was responsible not only for internal work at the Ministry, but also coordinated policy and directives with the Prime Minister's Office, Ministries, governmental branches and services. During his service as Deputy Director-General, Mr. Barak was in charge of developing ties with countries, which had not yet established diplomatic relations with Israel. After the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, Mr. Barak was named the Chief Coordinator for negotiations with the Palestinians. He held this position until 1996.

In 1987, Mr. Barak was posted as Counselor-Press Attaché to the Mission of Israel to the European Communities in Brussels, Belgium and also accredited to Luxembourg. He was promoted in 2001 to Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israel Embassy in Belgium and Luxembourg. Prior to his service in Europe, he represented the State of Israel as Second and later First Secretary at the Israel Embassy in Lima, Peru.

During his long service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Barak represented his country at numerous international meetings and conferences. Mr. Barak is a cum laude graduate of the Rothschild Foundation Scholarship program, and a graduate of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he read Political Science for an M.A. degree. Prior to that, he graduated with a B.A. in Political Science and General History from the Tel Aviv University. Mr. Barak immigrated to Israel in 1969. He was a volunteer on a Kibbutz in the Golan Heights for 15 months. He then served in the Israel Defense Forces in a combat unit. He has been a licensed tour guide since 1971, an occupation that helped him through his studies and since then, as been a hobby.

**Peter Brookes** is a Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation and the Director of the Asian Studies Center. In addition, he writes a weekly column on foreign policy and defense issues for the *New York Post*. His column is also carried by *The Boston Herald*, Japan's *Daily Yomiuri* and Taiwan's *China Post*. Brookes also appears regularly on network and cable TV and nationally-syndicated radio.

Prior to coming to the Heritage Foundation, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Asian and Pacific Affairs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; on the Republican Staff of the Committee on International Relations in the U.S. House of Representatives; with the Central Intelligence Agency; at the State Department; in the private sector at SAIC, TASC, and E-Systems; and on active duty with the U.S. Navy.

Brookes is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy; the Defense Language Institute; the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University.

He has a distinguished military background, including active duty in support of military operations in Iraq/Kuwait (Desert Storm); Haiti (Restore Democracy); and Bosnia (Joint Endeavor). He flew reconnaissance missions in East Asia and the Persian Gulf while stationed in Japan covering military matters related to the Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Vietnam, Iran and Iraq. Brookes has more than 1300 flight hours in Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft. While serving in Panama, he worked Latin American and Caribbean counter-narcotics and issues related to insurgencies/counter-insurgencies in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

As a Commander in the Naval Reserves, Brookes is assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency where he serves as an Associated Professor in the Masters-level Postgraduate Intelligence Program at the Joint Military Intelligence College. He has also performed reserve assignments as a staff officer, defense attaché, intelligence analyst and collector, and interpreter/translator with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Vice President and in support of the National Security Council.

**Ambassador Harvey Feldman** retired from the American Foreign Service after a career spanning more than three decades and four continents. An East Asian specialist for most of his career, Ambassador Feldman also served with distinction in Eastern Europe and at the United Nations.

Mr. Feldman served in Hong Kong for eight years, Taiwan for six, and Japan for four years. As a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, he helped plan President Richard Nixon's epoch-making first visit to China, and continued involvement with the process of relations with China as Director of the Office of the Republic of China Affairs. In that capacity, he created the American Institute in Taiwan which replaced our embassy in Taipei after relations were shifted to Peking. Though nominally an unofficial foundation, the Institute carries out all essential functions of our former embassy. He also was one of the drafters of the Taiwan Relations Act-landmark legislation that defines our relationship with the Republic of China in Taiwan.

After serving as American Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, he was asked by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to join her staff as Alternate U.S. Representative to the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador. He was a delegate to six UN General Assemblies, representing the United States in both Third and Fourth Committees. Feldman also served as U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council, led American delegations to the Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific, and also represented the United States on the Commission on Human Rights, and the Commission on the Status of Women.

After retiring from the Foreign Service, Ambassador Feldman spent a year as Vice President of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, a think tank specializing on arms control and disarmament issues. Thereafter he taught graduate seminars in international relations at New York University, with emphasis on tech-

niques of multilateral negotiation. After moving to Washington, D.C., he became a partner in Global Business Access, Ltd., a consulting firm formed by retired senior diplomats. A member of JINSA's Board of Advisors, Ambassador Feldman is also a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

Ambassador Harvey Feldman's languages are Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, and Bulgarian. His op-ed essays have appeared in *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Journal of Commerce*, and other papers. Longer articles have appeared in *Asian Survey*, *The National Interest*, and *the Strategic Studies Series of The Claremont Institute's Asian Studies Center*. He is also the editor of two books, *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, and *Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China*.

**Ambassador Raminder Singh Jassal** is Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of India in Washington, D.C., a position he assumed in January 2005. He previously served as Ambassador of India to Israel from 2001 through 2004.

A career Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Jassal has held a number of positions in the Indian government, including Spokesman, Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi; Joint Secretary (Planning & Coordination), Ministry of Defence; Joint Secretary (Central Asia) and Director (West Asia, North Africa), Minister of External Affairs.

Ambassador Jassal was Political Counsellor, Embassy of India, Moscow, a position he took after serving as Political Counsellor, Embassy of India in Washington, D.C. He served at the Embassy of India in Warsaw, Poland as well.

**Air Chief Marshal Srinivasapuram Krishnasawamy** retired as Chief of the Air Staff of the Indian Air Force. Air Chief Marshal Krishnasawamy was commissioned in the I.A.F. in 1961. He is operational on a number of combat aircraft including the Mirage-2000. He flew the Gnat during the 1965 and was awarded Mention in Despatches for his contribution. Subsequently, he was sent to the UK to undergo the Test Pilots Course. On his return, he joined the Air Force Flight Test Centre – Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE).

As a test pilot he was involved in flight-testing and evaluation of military as well as civil aircraft and weapon systems. The Air Chief Marshal has more than 4000 hours of flying experience and has captained over 30 varieties of aircraft and helicopters. He was also trained as a Fighter Combat Leader and served as Senior Instructional Staff at Tactics and Combat Development Establishment (TACDE).

The Air Chief Marshal has held a variety of operational and staff appointments during his career. Besides the command of a Squadron, he did a tenure as Chief Operations Officer of a Mirage-2000 base and commanded Air Force Station, Pune. In senior appointments, he has served as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Plans), Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of three operational Commands: Central, South Western and Western Air Command. He was appointed as Vice Chief of the Air Staff in 2001 and became Chief of the Air Staff in

December 2001.

The Air Chief Marshal is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College and is an alumnus of the National Defence College. He is a recipient of the Param Vishisht Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal and a bar to Vayu Sena Medal.

**Dr. Gal Luft** is executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS). He specializes in strategy, counter terrorism, geopolitics, and energy security. He has published numerous studies and articles on international security and energy issues in various newspapers and publications including *Foreign Affairs*, *Commentary Magazine*, *Middle East Quarterly*, *LA Times*, *The Washington Post* and *The Wall Street Journal*. He has given numerous media interviews and has consulted various think tanks including the Brookings Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and RAND. He is also a visiting lecturer at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy School of Special Warfare Center & School, at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Dr. Luft is a former lieutenant colonel in the Israel Defense Forces. In his fifteen-year military career he commanded combat battalions in southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip; he worked with the Palestinian Authority since its inauguration in 1994 and was commander of Jenin, Ramallah and Rafah.

Dr. Luft holds degrees in international relations, international economics, Middle East studies and strategic studies. He was educated in Bar Ilan and Tel Aviv Universities and holds a masters and doctorate in strategic studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University.

**Juli A. MacDonald** is a Senior Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton with 11 years experience conceptualizing and developing alternative futures and scenario-building exercises for national security and private sector clients; conducting research of political, economic, energy, and military trends in Eurasia, South Asia and Asia Pacific; designing workshops and seminars that examine regional dynamics, military strategies, and the implications for U.S. interests. Ms. MacDonald has eight years experience supporting the Office of Net Assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense in assessing the future security environment in Eurasia. She was the principal author of studies that explored the alternatives futures of Eurasia broadly, and then of China, Turkey, India, and energy strategies specifically.

Ms. MacDonald is the author of a pioneering study for the Office of Net Assessment, *The Indo-U.S. Military Relationship*, which explored the expectations and perceptions of over 80 American and Indian national security planners and military officers.

In addition, Ms. MacDonald assisted the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) in developing an environmental security engagement strategy for India. She collaborated with the United Service Institution of India to support a joint tabletop gaming exercise held in New Delhi in

September 2003.

Prior to joining Booz Allen, Ms. MacDonald was a Program Analyst for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where she specialized in the development of alternative future scenarios for different strategic regions. Much of her work during this time focused on energy security and the evolution of strategic thinking in India and energy strategies of Asian actors. While at SAIC, Ms. MacDonald organized over 25 workshops, seminars, and scenario-building exercises for commercial and government clients and was the primary author of over 20 reports focused on different aspects of strategic dynamics in Eurasia.

Ms. MacDonald holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of the Pacific, School of International Studies and an MSc in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

**Lieutenant Colonel Behram A. Sahukar** is a Senior Fellow in Counterterrorism at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi and is a Research Scholar for West Asia/Israel at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

**Major General Amos Yadlin** is Defense and Armed Forces Attaché at the Embassy of Israel, where is accredited to both the United States and Canada. He previously served as the Commander of the I.D.F. Colleges. The I.D.F. colleges include the National Defense College, the Staff and Command College and the Tactical Command College.

Major General Yadlin is a graduate of the I.A.F. Flight School, receiving his wings in 1972 and qualifying as a fighter pilot. Since then, Major General Yadlin has accumulated approximately 4,500 flight hours on the following fighters: Ouragan, Mirage, A-4, F-4, Kfir, F-16, F-15 and F-15I. He has executed 255 combat missions behind enemy lines, including participating in the Yom Kippur and the Peace for Galilee wars and the attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.

Major General Yadlin has commanded two fighter squadrons, two airbases, and served in several leading Israeli Air Force staff appointments, before assuming his current position.

He has a B.A. in Economics and Business Administration from Ben-Gurion University, graduating in 1985 with honors, and a Master's degree in Public Administration from JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 1994.

In 1972, Major General Yadlin served as an active fighter pilot in an Ouragan squadron. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, he flew in an A-4 squadron. In 1974, Major General Yadlin was appointed as a flight instructor in the I.A.F. flight School. From 1976 to 1978, he served in two different Mirage squadrons. In 1978, he was stationed as Second Deputy Commander of a Kfir squadron. During 1980-1981, Major General Yadlin was an active member of the evaluation team of the F-16 fighter in the I.A.F. In 1982, during the Peace for Galilee War, he flew as an F-16 First Deputy Squadron Commander. From 1983 to 1985, he studied for his B.A. at Ben-Gurion

University and graduated with highest distinction.

In 1985 he was appointed as an A-4 Squadron Commander, and in 1987 he was appointed to command an F-15 Squadron. In 1990 he was promoted to Colonel and nominated as Head of the Planning and Organization department. From 1993 to 1994 Major General Yadlin attended Harvard University, where he studied for his Master Degree in Public Administration. In 1994 Major General Yadlin was appointed as Nevatim Air Force Base Commander. In 1995 he was promoted to Brigadier General and was appointed as Hatserim Air Force Base Commander, the largest airbase in Israel. The base is the site of the I.A.F. Flight School and the F-15I strategic squadron. In 1998, the Major General assumed the position of I.A.F. Director of Intelligence.

In June 2000 Major General Yadlin was appointed as Chief of Air Staff and Deputy Commander of the Israeli Air Force. In February 2002, the Brig. Gen. was promoted to Major General and assumed the position of the Commander of the I.D.F. Colleges until his appointment to Washington in 2004.

Proceedings from the 2005 Conference on

# Strengthening International Security:

## A Best Practices Exchange Between the United States, India & Israel

The United States, Israel and India are each engaged in a battle against terrorist extremists. Recognizing that the international terror network requires an equally international counter-terror network to defeat it, the leadership of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) brought together experts from each of these three democracies drawn from the intelligence, military and diplomatic fields of each country for the purpose of strengthening their already growing partnership and promoting concerted action against terrorism in its multiple forms.

In an effort to ensure that the relationships forged during the trilateral conference would continue beyond the meetings' end, a conference series was planned. The inaugural event – held in February 2003 in New Delhi – underscored the importance of developing an ongoing strategic interchange between the three countries.

The overwhelming success of the conference in India led directly to the second conference held in February 2004 in Herzliya, Israel. This event spurred the conference directors to further pursue the goals announced at the first event and to establish additional frameworks relating to the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.

It was with great anticipation as well as gratitude to conference host Patton Boggs LLP, that the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and its conference cosponsor, the U.S.-India Institute, held the third United States-India-Israel Trilateral Security Conference in Washington, D.C. in March 2005.

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