

— **PANEL TWO** —

The Global War on Terror – Military Perspectives

— INTRODUCTION OF — SECOND PANEL

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This morning we talked about the broad and strategic ties between the U.S., India, and Israel, but I think we would be remiss if we didn't really talk about the real reason that we're here, and it's not so much about economics, or about gas pipelines, or a relationship with China. It is really about the global war on terror. So this afternoon's first panel is going to talk about the military perspective on the global war on terror. We have three military experts with us. From Israel, we have Major General Amos Yadlin. From India we have recently retired Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy, and representing the United States we have Ambassador Harvey Feldman. So, let me turn it over to Major General Yadlin to talk about the Israeli perspective on the global war on terror.

*Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, IDF
Defense & Armed Forces Attache, Embassy of Israel*

When confronted with the Year 2000 terror campaign against the State of Israel, the first questions that we asked ourselves as a military, and at that time I was Deputy Commander of the Air Force – can terror be defeated? We know how to defeat conventional armies, traditional armies based on tanks, airplanes, and submarines. And suddenly we face another kind of military threat, which most of our tactics, strategies and doctrines were not fitted to cope with the threat. So we start listening to a lot of popular legend, a lot of statements that as a military we felt a little bit unhappy to hear – terror cannot be defeated by military force. Terror cannot be defeated at all. Terror always defeats democratic states. Terror is not rational so you can't as a rational guy cope with it. Terror cannot be deterred. And you know, as much as you cut the grass, there is always new terrorists coming from below, and then even Secretary Rumsfeld, who was a model for us, there was a leak that he said that the harder we work, the farther behind we get. So we sit in the Israeli defense forces, in the Israeli Air Force and we try to craft a comprehensive strategy against terror. And standing before you four years after that with a cautious statement, I want to do the statement that Israel have done it, and Israel won maybe not the war on terror, but at least the big campaign that was launched against it in September, 2000.

And you have all the right to ask me how

you judge such a victory, what is your measurement for success? Because, again in the traditional war, you judge a victory by occupying the enemy's territory, or by destroying his army, or both. So I want to give you my measurement for success in the war against terror.

First of all, take the numbers, and the numbers – this is a chart of number of suicide bombers that penetrate Israel and succeeded every month. The yellow and the red is those that succeeded whether in Gaza Strip, or Judea and Samaria, or in Israel – the 1948 borders. And the blue one is those that we are stopping. As you can see that in the year 2004, it almost went to zero. But the numbers is not enough. They support my conclusion that I think we have to look at the terror not as terror itself, but what the terror should achieve. And when Arafat launched the terror attack against Israel, it was part of a whole game. The terror was only one pillar in it. There was the demography that should work for him, there was the occupationality that you bring the world behind him, and he has the veto on the peace forces. But basically, what he wanted to achieve is to take all that has been dealt to us from strategic point of view, and make them negative.

So my list is not an official list, but think about the social resilience of the Israel society, the economic growth, the rate of investment, the financial rating in the world market, the sense of security of our citizens, the optimism

about the future of the state, and maybe the smile on the face of the children – all this went down to the negative in the first two year of the armed intifada, until we found the strategy how to cope with it. And if you look at all these barometers, in 2004 all of them are now positive. Economic growth is 4 percent, investment going up, the stock market if you put some money there you are rich by now, and the financial rating of Israel is very good, and the people are smiling again. And my wife even let my kids go out to the restaurants, and to the nightclubs.

So how did we do it?

I put intelligence first, and this is because it is the most important thing. Intelligence dominates. We used to have a very good intelligence to find airplanes, tanks, command and control headquarters, but the intelligence on the terror was very weak. And nobody can win the war on terror if you don't have a good intelligence, because the terrorists are stealthy actors. You developed the F-22, JSF, F-117, B-2 to be stealthy aircraft. Terrorists are the stealthy performers today, and if you don't have the right radar to pick them up, you're going to find them in the entrance to the nightclubs, to the bus. We want to stop them in their beds. We want to stop them on the way. We want to stop them before they launch their attack.

So we were able to create a very efficient intelligence system. If it is not an operational intelligence it is not good enough. The intelligence officers love to give you a very smart analysis of what's going on. This is not enough. You need coordinates for the bullets, for the missiles, and sensor to shoot in real time is the name of the game.

In the year 2002, we moved from defense to offense, Operational Defense Shield took over again the West Bank under our control, instead of let the Palestinians doing the job to secure Israel, we took it again to our hands. And what is really important and was not understood in the first two years, that this is not enough to eliminate a terrorist once a month. You have to eliminate them in a rate, in a tempo

that is bigger than they are coming from below. And we developed a system that can eliminate terrorists in a rate that is larger than a new terrorist, a new efficient terrorist are coming. Again, not all of them, but a critical mass that will make the terrorist even think that they want a cease-fire.

Defense. Defense is still an important pillar. And for every institution that you want to defend, we have built a security fence, and the results are astonishing how much it is helping to stop terrorism coming from the West Bank to Israel. Just give you one number.

We had almost 190 suicide attacks in Israel. Only two of them came from Gaza, because there is a fence around Gaza, and those who came from Gaza, one of them came with a British passport to Tel Aviv, and the second one came in a container with Hadera goods. So the fence is very, very effective. Cities like Hadera, like Netanya that were under attack in the first two years, now no terror event in the last two years since the security fence is there.

Learning and cross-adaption. The terrorists are not stupid. They have the advantage of not having the big bureaucracy behind them. They adapt quickly to our tactics. If we are not developing a system that is learning, that is adapting quicker than the terrorists, we are going to lose this fight. The learning system should be all the way from the Chief of Staff office, to the Division Headquarters, to the Company Commanders. And it should be very open learning forces.

Legitimation. We could eliminate much more terrorists in the beginning. We didn't do it because we didn't want to lose the sympathy of our crowd, of our constituency, as well as our allies. And step-by-step we gained the legitimacy to fight terror based on the mistakes of our enemy, and the way they created their terror campaign. So what was illegitimate in 2001 became legitimate during the fight, and you have all the time to check the borders, the limits of your legitimacy from your own people, and from the outside.

Deterrence. We really were able to establish deterrence towards the terror organization, and to foil the legend that you can't deter the terrorist. Because the terrorist may send a boy from the market or a girl that her family thinks that she didn't behave to commit a suicide, but as organizations they don't want to commit suicide. They have goals, objectives, political objectives, and if you are able to see what's dear to the terrorist, and to make them understand that this is a counterproductive kind of campaign, and that's really what happened to the Palestinians. The fact that Mohammad Abbas is now telling the Palestinians that terror is not a good strategy, is not because it is unethical, or suddenly he thinks that Israel is a wonderful state. This is because he understood that terror brings them bad results from their point of view. And maybe bin Laden should think what he did to the American presence in the Middle East, what he achieved according to his attack.

Make the leadership pay. The leadership should not, based on what I said a minute before, should not be immune to attack. And most of the leadership of the terror organization tries to be a political leadership, but they are not. They are involved with the operational decisions, and they should not be immune to a military attack.

The society should be strong. One of our fears in the beginning of this terror attack was that our society will break, and I've seen some people die and give up. So you have to explain to society by our leadership how much it's important that the terrorists will not feel that they achieved what they want to achieve.

Moral superiority is very important. You don't want to play in the same rules that the terrorists are playing. Keeping your army and your soldiers with clean hands, trying to hit only the terrorists, and not the innocent people around them. It is not easy. I don't have time, but I wrote a whole paper about it. It will be in the next Journal of Military Ethics, but we deal a lot with it. We don't want to be in the same

level as the terrorist.

Last but not least, most of the wars were done by military. In this war, part of the security agencies that are fighting are not army. It is the police, it is the internal security forces, it is the Mossad, sometimes it's financial regulation. And it must be coordinated, and you know how difficult it is. And we came to a level of cooperation that I'm really proud of, that the coordinates of the terrorist are given by another organization. It's not done with their military intelligence. It's the Israeli security forces, but we sit in one room and we have computers and speak with each other. And again, it wasn't achieved in the first year, but after four years, we come to a very good coordination.

We are still not good enough. We are not controlling the external support of the terrorist good enough. They are still getting a lot of support from the outside, arms from Egypt, money from Iran, from Lebanon, a lot of support from Syria, know-how, and the external support for the terrorist should be eliminated a little bit better, especially the money because the money can drive a lot of things. And the battle for hard earned money is very difficult in our case, very, very difficult. Whatever you are doing, it is so ineffective compared to the incitement and the education, and the leadership messages that the Palestinians are getting from their own leaders, at least until Mr. Arafat's demise. So if terror can be defined as capabilities of terrorists, multiplied by the motivation, we did very well in taking these capabilities of terror, and of bringing them really down. Motivation is the next challenge.

The last slide, and I already spoke about all of it. The meaning of this slide is to tell you that the military here is only part of a whole strategy, comprehensive strategy that should be discussed between the military and our political masters, and the other organization. If you don't have this comprehensive map of knowledge, and the actions that are driven out of this map of knowledge, you are not going to win this war. But winning this war is a pos-

sibility, it is doable, and we don't have to take all these excuses that I showed you in the first slide – we have to craft the strategy and go and do it. Thank you.

Air Chief Marshal Srinivasapuram Krishnaswamy
Indian Air Force (ret.)

What we are looking at today is a global war on terrorism. I'll be saying Israel is fighting the battle very well; and, therefore, what do we draw from their, very good experience, and apply all this together, and then we all can put things together that is the right recipe to fight terrorism in a global manner. Like you have doctrines, there are very little difference between one country to the other, very similar battlefield doctrines and so on. It depends on technology and the kind of munitions you have. But when I see terrorism and the way we see them today in the world, and how we fight, there's very large difference. And some of it I wish to illustrate possibly picking up from the trade, so there is some level of continuity. So I see the whole thing slightly differently now.

When we hear Israeli experience, and some part I could compare from what my perception is, is that they've been successful. We've also been fighting terrorism, not one or two years. It's now 15 years. Numbers don't matter at the end of the day. As he so well brought out, it's about tolerance, how much will the society, how much will it take, how much can it take? And similarly from the terrorist point of view, they assess what is the vulnerability of the society, and all your goodies that you are trying to protect from the terrorist, how safe they are, how they're perceived to be safe. So based on that is these various gradings of what I call success

from either side. So we've been at it for now 15 years, and Israel has been at it for many years.

At the end of the day, if it is of great concern to all of us that we look at it globally, and then we have to ask this question – hey, have we been successful? Is it getting worse or better? But general perception is, especially after 9/11, it is getting worse in a global situation. I'm not talking about specific to Israel, or to us, maybe in the Philippines and somewhere else. The very fact that we're getting together, it is of great concern to all of us. It bothers all of us. We better get together and fight. And the very fact that we want to get together and fight, that means we are not happy with what's happening in various corners. And that all of us share.

And when we compare from one country to another, it is the level of tolerance – of course, as my Ambassador brought out this morning – I wasn't here for the rest of the talks, Israel population and India's population is large difference. How much the society can take or they can't – but lives are lives, and we lost anywhere from 40-60,000.

We lose a soldier a day every day for the last 15 years, every day, 15 years, and that's a lot of numbers. If you talk about civilians and the innocents who die, you say anywhere 40-50,000. And in terms of number of incidents, we have similar graphs, and the success depends really on where is various issues. And fundamentally, unlike military battles, the objectives are what

you call the end-state. The end-state is not so well definable to say we've reached the end, and we start this war on terrorism. Nothing to start, we're already involved in war on terrorism, when is it going to finish? And how long are we going to keep fighting this? And there are soldiers involved, decision-makers involved, politicians involved. Of course, people are involved, and all are anxiously waiting – hey, when is it going to end? What is the end-state?

Is there anyone who is confident here to say okay, one year from now, 365 days it'll be there. It'll be over, finished. So based on that, we assess ourselves, our efficiency, our capability, our innovativeness, and our abilities, and so on and so forth. Is there any one of us here confident enough to say okay, come on so and so date from now, it'll be over?

The very fact that well, I can't say from my point of view, then makes me believe to say are we winning or losing, or where are we now? And so I see it from a slightly different perspective; that is, it is a "war", in the term as we generally understand war, is not the same of what you are fighting against terrorists. It's warlike, the seriousness with which we take is warlike, but it's also different.

If the fact is like he brought out that how sensitive is the public? What happens to your stock market? What happens to your financial growth, economy, foreign direct investment in India, you take the other example here in my area, we've lost much more in numbers, are losing much more in numbers, and their economy is growing at 7 percent. And foreign direct investment is, you know, you heard enough this morning. There's plenty of money floating in. And economically we've very happy, happier than last year, but are we happy as a country? Certainly not. So the measures also, of course, could differ depending upon how society takes it.

The other very interesting aspect is that it's practically impossible – I would say it is incorrect to draw other than certain important factors or elements, to draw what you call a

standard of application across the globe of how we should fight the war on terrorism, or how it should be done.

For example, in the Indian Subcontinent where we are fighting, the terrain is very important there. We are fighting in the Himalayas. You have the passes at 23,000 feet, 24,000 feet, and winters it's not passable; and yet they pass through. We have jungles that are very, very thick, and we have rivers, and it's terrible, very difficult terrain. And we also have fenced some area, but it's not practical to fence right across mountains and valleys. But certainly, I shared with him a fence does help. The boundaries are demarcated well, and then you can guard it, but the terrain is very, very important.

The next is what's the backup you have. You have troops, you have police people. What exactly are we guarding, the backup from the line?

The intelligence, of course that's very important common factor, but the terrain, the facilities we have, the vulnerability of the situation, and the powers around this neighborhood, or for that matter influence your country like United States, the west – how they feel about what you call a global impression, and that is brought on to bear in where actually the terrorism is taking place.

For example, India we went through hell on the so-called Human Right violation. And time is short really to say here that Human Rights violation, the way it was brought on in India, to a particular time and context, and how it is seen in other parts of the world where so-called warlike or war situations going on, is measured differently by different societies. And farther away from the place you are – we are sitting here in Washington – and what is the best description can give, even if I had done a video presentation – it's not possible for us to sit here and perceive an actual situation going on there. This is also so-called blown up by the terrorist to say the collateral damage, some odd innocent gets killed. And those are blown up and publicized out of proportion. And that is a weapon actually, they use this as a weapon to

stop action against the terrorists.

And after all, if they are taking so-called shelter in the villages, and shelter of innocents, then an odd innocent would get, of course, hurt. That's a matter of statistics, irrespective of whatever the PGMs we may have, the special weapons you may have, whatever that is. But the innocents will so-called get hurt. I mean, it is a fact. But now it's not seen as only the military, the uniformed guys are at war. It is a society, the entire society is at war. It concerns the village, it concerns the people, the public, and there are innocents, yes; but it is very peculiar, it is very tortuous to even explain, but it affects the entire society, so many people do get hurt. But there are parts that use this as human right violation, and so we are naturally answerable on this, but then when it has happened elsewhere, they're much quieter, so it depends how you measure this aspect, as well, and who gets encouraged in the bargain.

Human right violation, the vulnerability, as I touched upon this earlier. Then there is a sensitivity, sensitivity of the people, the public, the nation, the neighborhood, and of course, today we are looking at things globally.

How to stop terrorism. It covers many other things than the purely military. It's financial support, the manpower, how much manpower they have, and where do they get the manpower from? Now like we were talking about Jihadis. It's a huge machine. It has financial support. Our children are taken into those madrassas, and brainwashed, and brainwashed enough to say okay, you have to go and kill yourself, and that's good. I mean, the religion says that you should do it, that is you go and kill the infidels or whatever that is called. It's a big machine. And they have enough arms and ammunition in our part of the world. We have terrorists who are carrying the Stinger missile, or the SAM-7s, or whatever that you call, rocket launchers. We have captured enough small arms and ammunition to equip a division. It's on display in Kashmir. We can show it to anybody. We've shown it to all diplomats anyway.

So there seems to be endless flow of ammunition and money, or whatever that is.

And generally we are very well informed here and how does this flow from, and how is it to be tapped, and so on and so forth.

So coming back to this in a quick summary, that what happens on the ground, whether it's in Israel near Gaza Strip, or whether it happens in Kashmir, or somewhere else, in Philippines or in Malaysian jungle, there can be a vast difference in how it is being fought, and what the environment is. So it is very difficult to tactically define in terms of how it is to be fought. It is to be evolved in each area very specifically because politics has got a lot to do with it, the environment has a lot to do with it. And, of course, as I said, public and various other issues. But if I compare India and say in Israel, it's very typical, and they are not easily applicable in a manner to each other. But there are, of course, some common issues which we very well perceive.

So when I look at it in today's context, since this morning, we are talking about U.S., Israel, and India as three democracies. You're looking at this together with a lot of seriousness to say hey, is there some way we can get together, and put our heads together, and combat this great severe menace, which is actually getting worse? And I believe yes, we must. And the first connectivity, most important, is at a political level, the democracies at the highest level, they must click together and show the world, demonstrate or so-call publicize or in whatever the best manner known to the politicians, to say hey, we are in it together, and it is very important. National will is political will, and national will is reflected in the political will. And today we are very, very – what should I say – very impressed, and very, very happy with the Bush administration. They have spelled out very, very clearly, and the President himself, and my Prime Minister has gone on record to say that India is committed to combating WMD proliferation, terrorism, and put our head and shoulder together in enhancing global security. So

there is a very clear convergence in this.

Of course, United States – it's a very old democracy and, of course, India has a very long relation with them. But as relation with Israel is concerned, it's relatively new. That is between us, but 12 years or so, or 15 years, I remember that I was one of the first few to visit Israel from the military, about 1993 or so, to see and understand what's going on there. And whatever little I saw, it impressed me to no extent. And one is the way that you see life, and there is so much in common in terms of perception. And the warmth, friendliness, and the good feeling – it's really – what do I call it – it just struck us very, very deep, and that clicked so well, I must say that we are absolutely in harmony as far as the motive part is concerned. And, therefore, today when we say hey, there's three countries, we're three democracies – is there something we can do together? And I believe certainly yes, and there is a political will, which has been said, and now we must get on with it to the next step, what exactly we do.

There are some points, as said in earlier meetings, and I would like to recall some of this. This is a march of continuity, this is our National Security Advisor, Mr. Brajesh Mishra. I believe he was here at a JINSA conference. He said that, "India, United States, and Israel have common fundamental similarities. We share common vision of pluralism, tolerance, and equal opportunities. However," he said, "that an agreed definition of terrorism still eludes the international community." It's a fact, and it's still sometimes said that terrorists in India are perceived to be terrorists by India. It's not necessarily recognized internationally, so there has got to be some kind of a clear understanding or so-called definition internationally. That he added, "The fallacy of distinction being sought between freedom fighters and terrorists which glorify massacre of one set of innocent civilians while condemning killing of others. He dismissed the impression being created that terrorism can only be eradicated by addressing its root causes." He said, "That's

utter nonsense. Terrorist attacks against innocents have no justification whatsoever."

Now these are something very, what I call it, common denominator, and this is said a couple of years ago. And while preparing for this while I'm making some reading, and this struck me as hey, we haven't crossed after that, and I think much being done after that on these important issues.

"Terrorist attacks against innocents have no justification, irrespective of what the reason is. He sought democratic countries to form a viable alliance against terrorism, and develop the multi-lateral mechanism to counter it.

In terms of tactics and how exactly to combat there are specialists. They'll do it, and all around between the three, all countries. And the technique may differ from area to area, and so on and so forth. That's relatively minor, but it must have a political will and moral authority to take bold positions in extreme cases of terrorist provocation." This was said three years ago.

"We urge that a corps consisting of democratic society should emerge which can take on international terrorism in a holistic and focused manner." But this has not happened to our entire satisfaction, as we all hear.

The ground realities, as I said, is somewhat complex. At places coordination is lacking, as the issues are processed in compartments while danger seems imminent. India has been fighting terrorists for decades, which I have already mentioned. I talked about it yesterday. We've been seeking the attention of the U.S. and other friendly countries on Taliban, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Hisbul Mujahideen, and so on and so forth, and of course, madrassas, the schools, and the ISI of Pakistan – General Hamid Gul, he was the former Director General of Pakistan Inter-Services Agency – he boasted in private conversation, it is recorded – "This agency has established at least another 300 operational cells across India."

Now in those discussions earlier, terrorism was given in three groups – one what they called state-sponsored. There are groups, and

of course, individuals. Now internationally, or if we are getting together, so are we doing something about state-sponsored? Are we serious about it? Are we going to do something together about it? Are we going to do something together about the groups, individual – we leave it to the policemen. But how far have we gone in this? And are we very serious about this getting together and fighting this menace globally? So if you haven't done much in the past, but then it's time that we should do something now on ground.

September 11, of course, opened everyone's eyes, and very soon after 9/11 we launched the so-called war against terrorism, of course, in Afghanistan, an extremely impoverished country that had been battered for decades, Afghanistan. Had even 50 percent - this is my personal view – had even 50 percent of the money that is spent to bomb Afghanistan been spent on its development timely, that the tragedy may not have occurred at all. It's unfortunate, but people of Afghanistan are not in focus today as much as bin Laden is.

Terrorists of Pakistani origin attack Indian parliament that is known, and we nearly went to war, and the war has been averted. We all are familiar with the efforts taken. Let's leave that behind. But my focus today is what should we do now from here on?

The Middle East, of course, is well illustrated by our friend from Israel, and this morning I think we touched upon Lebanon and Syria. It's a great cause to worry to all of us. Iran seems to have decided to continue building nuclear weapons. It's terrible, it's madness. Iraq is unstable, it continues to be unstable. We are very familiar with Shiite and Sunni clashes, and today what's happening in Iraq. I'm very concerned about, you know, we have – India's experience and very periodically Shiite-Sunni clashes, so has Pakistan. So we are very familiar with these.

In fact, in my opinion, the U.S. popularity seems to have hit rock bottom in the Middle East. There appears to be no let off of war in

Afghanistan, although we've gone through this elections and so on. Spread of WMD today is a very serious concern to all of us, and once again I confirm here that India would certainly join actions, any action that is proposed, suggested to counter spread of WMD.

Now when you look at Europe, it's slightly different. It seems to just the other day in Spain, they had this anniversary of the great tragedy that struck in Spain, large number of innocents were killed in that bombing of train. United Kingdom has brought in legislation to facilitate tagging the suspects and interrogate them with the least formalities. There's a recent one. And generally, that we see greater resolve among the nations in Europe to fight terrorism, and there is a unity of effort that I sense, I perceive. And internationally, there's certainly – and today there is a greater coordination in the areas of communication, banking, travel, customs, immigration, shipping, policing, et cetera, which has helped a great deal in surveillance that is essential to combat terrorism, so there are some good things happening.

I would like to say a few words before I close down. Indian democracy – I want to say a few things. Some are repetitive of yesterday, that we are secular in India. We have more Muslims in India than Pakistan or Bangladesh, but we all belong to the same stock, the same race. India has a large Christian population. We have many other religions like Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism, et cetera, et cetera. So the secularism has survived for centuries in the Subcontinent; and, in fact, it is the only mode of survival for India. India to be a nation, it has to be secular, and a democracy. It is only more that we can survive, whereas religion was used by some other countries to emotionalize its public sentiments against India, so in our national interest, that is India, it must prevent, stop – we have to prevent, stop, discourage, eradicate, fight militancy, religious fundamentalism, insurgency, et cetera. The combination makes India a natural ally to combat and counter terrorism with like-minded democracies. And whether it

is the state, or group, or individual terrorizing innocents, we must combat all of these. Motivation of terrorists is high, and they are very well organized. They have technology to some extent to support them. The political will we have all demonstrated, and this would go on.

But once again, I would underline that implementation in my mind is lacking. There are delays and hesitation, possibly it is a bit bureaucratic. Once a decision is taken, it should be left to the professionals to execute in a manner that they would know the best. Combating terrorism calls for specially trained, equipped personnel. India has been combating for decades. Technology gives us certain better options, with every new invention. Exposure to special forces in other friendly countries does afford the opportunity to learn and to improve.

Most importantly, it is the will to fight, which we all have demonstrated we have in plenty. Thank you.

Ambassador Harvey Feldman
U.S. Ambassador, (ret.)

Let me say first that listening to these two presentations, there is a phrase that rang through my mind. It's a Japanese phrase, "Osora Iri Mashta", and what that means is, "I cannot possibly come up to your expectations." And so, I have to begin by saying "Osora Iri Mashta."

Is there a global war on terrorism? I think the first thing we have to say about it is that the title creates a wrong impression, because it implies that terrorism is one thing wherever it exists. And I do not believe that is the case. I think that is wrong.

The tactics the terrorists may use are similar. As we learned from the past with terrorism, destruction, the killing of civilian people to strike terror into the heart – this is similar, but the organization and motivations of the Basque terrorists, ETA in Spain, or the various Corsican terrorist groups, or the Provisional IRA – their organization, their motivations are not the same as the Jihadi groups that range the world, are not the same of those groups that cross the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, are not the same of Hezbollah.

Indeed, I would say that the organization and tactics of Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao are hardly the same as the tactics of the terrorist insurgency in Iraq, or for that matter, the dregs of the Taliban along the Afghan-Pakistan border. And as these organizations are not the same and their names are not the same, I really think

the tactics for combating them cannot be the same. I think we have to have different strokes for different folks, if we are to be effective.

Fighting the Iraqi insurgencies is surely a military problem, but to fight the vast terrorists of ETA, I think is primarily a police problem. Indeed, within India itself, there has been a difference between the tactics used, for example, by K.P.S. Gill in the Punjab, and the tactics that are necessary in Kashmir.

In Malaysia, the Police Special Branch has done quite well in blowing up Jihadi cells, but Hezbollah where it exists inside and outside of Lebanon presents a different problem. The Philippines is yet a different story, because Abu Sayyaf is as much a criminal gang as it is a terrorist operation.

As you all know, and as reference has already been made, there was recently a conference in Madrid on combating terrorism. And one of the statements that emerged had it that most nations affected by terrorism are too weak to combat it on their own.

Now I'm all in favor of international cooperation to work against terrorist organizations. This is absolutely necessary. If we did not believe that, we wouldn't even be having this conference. We need to share intelligence, to share police work, and that in fact is happening. But surely we have come to a very sorry state when the Mayor of Madrid, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon, is quoted as saying to his international visitors,

“Look, we need your efforts to feel safe again. We need you to find out how to stop it happening to us again.” I think that’s shocking.

Can you imagine the mayor of Tel Aviv saying that after the Dolphinarium nightclub bombing?

Can you imagine an Indian government minister saying that after the attack on the Indian parliament – we need you to come and help us? I think two things; one, it speaks to the state of morale in certain parts of Europe. And also, it ascribes something like super-human status to these killers, and this is a mistake.

So who are these killers? Do they come from broken homes, dysfunctional families? If we were able to eliminate poverty, would terrorism and terrorists disappear? Supposing we provided better educational opportunities, and better economic opportunities, would that be the end of terrorism?

You know, there is an American forensic psychiatrist, Mark Sageman, who teaches at the University of Pennsylvania, and he has done full longitudinal studies on 134 al Qaeda and similar terrorists on whom we have substantial biographic data, and the results are quite striking. By the way, this latest issue of the journal published by JINSA, which I used to edit, has an article by Sageman, which I truly think you should read. Let me just quote something I just said: “The common stereotype is that terrorism is the product of poor, desperate, naive single young men from Third World countries, vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into terror. Unpacking this formula, the geographic origins of the mujahedeen should be not only the Third World, but also the poorest countries of the Third World. It also implies that they come from the lowest socio-economic strata.”

All right. So who are these people? Of the 134 of whom Sageman has collected data, 57 were professionals. There were doctors, architects, engineers and such, 44 had been policemen, members of the military, university students, businessmen. Many of them were married and had children. Two-thirds had at

least some college education, making them far more educated than the norm in the countries from which they came. Almost all came from families that in their own societies were at least middle class, if not in fact from the wealthiest strata of those societies.

Now I have to tell you that he is not studying any of the Palestinian groups. Okay? He’s talking about al Qaeda. As a group, Sageman tells us, they’re rather cosmopolitan. They’d studied abroad. Most joined their terrorist cells in countries other than their own. The 9/11 group, for example, were recruited from Arab students in Germany. The Madrid bombers came from students and ex-students in Spain. That’s something that someone should tell the mayor of Madrid.

Interesting enough, they were not loners. They were clicks of students or former students who joined terrorist cells as a group. And the interesting thing is that normally they formed themselves into a group first, and then they looked for an umbrella terrorist group to join, al Qaeda or some others. We should read Sageman.

We’re running late so I’m going to cut this short. I will conclude with a few quotes. “Passionate hatred can give meaning and purpose to life. People haunted by the purposelessness of their lives try to find new content, not only in dedicating themselves to a holy cause, but also by nursing a fanatical grievance. A mass movement offers them unlimited opportunity for both.”

Here’s another quote: “All mass movements generate in their adherence a readiness to die and proclivity for united action. All of them, irrespective of the doctrine they preach, the program they project, all of them breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, fervent hope, hatred, and intolerance. All of them are capable of releasing a powerful flow of activity in certain departments of life. All of them demand their followers’ blind faith and single hearted allegiance.” These words could certainly describe al Qaeda, Hezbollah or the Chechens who

slaughtered the school children in Beslan in Northern Ossetia.

Actually, they were written more than 50 years ago by a man named Eric Hoffer, a self-educated longshoreman in San Francisco. He had also been a lumberjack, a dishwasher, and at one time a migrant farmer. He wrote in the aftermath of World War II, he wondered how a former German army corporal had been able to turn the country of Beethoven into his private killing machine. He wondered how a Russian exile could seize control of a vast empire, and how one of his disciples, a former seminarian from the southern end of that empire, managed to hold it in unquestioned personal control for 25 years, during which time millions were slaughtered.

What marked them out he concluded, Hoffer, was “audacity and a joy in defiance, an iron will, a fanatical conviction that he, and he alone is possessed of the only truth.” The name of Hoffer’s book is “The True Believer”, and it’s worth reading today, 54 years after it was first published. Thank you.