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Armeane M. Choksi : President, US-India Institute
In the aftermath of September 11, in addition
to the values of freedom and democracy shared by both U.S.
and India, the common approach for both these countries to
unambiguously condemn terror as a religious, ideological or
political instrument and to confront terrorism head-on in
a global war further binds these two countries together. At
the highest levels, they have worked together in the UN to
promote the India-sponsored Comprehensive Convention Against
International Terrorism, on a separate U.S.-India Cyber- Terrorism
Initiative and have set up the U.S.-India Joint Working Group
on Counter Terrorism. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for South Asian Affairs, Donald Camp said in April 2002, "amidst
all the change in the region since September 11, one thing
has remained a constant. This is the ever-broadening and strategically
important U.S. relationship with India." This is highlighted
by the fact that since July 2001, more than 50 U.S. policy
makers at or above the Assistant Secretary level have visited
India and several senior members of the Prime Minister's national
security team have visited the U.S. Moreover, Indian soldiers
have trained with US forces in Alaska -- training that the
U.S. undertakes only with its close allies and friends. The
two countries have also agreed to joint naval operations and
joint exercises by the U.S. and Indian airforces in the South
Asian region; these are operations that would have been unheard
of before. US and Indian Special forces have also trained
together in dense jungles to root out terrorists from their
hiding places, the first ever combat exercises between the
best US and Indian fighter squadrons are expected to take
place next year, and to test their clandestine and unconventional
warfare skills, Indian Marine Commando Forces and the US Navy
SEALs are planning joint exercises. Furthermore, the US and
India are now also working more closely together cooperating
in the peaceful uses of outer space; the leadership of NASA
and the Indian Space Research Organization met in Houston
last year to work on a common agenda. As a result of these
increasing interactions, there is currently a rather comprehensive
U.S.-India policy agenda which, inter-alia, focuses on diplomacy,
anti-terrorism, intelligence and law enforcement, defense
cooperation, civil nuclear and space collaboration, economic
interaction and scientific and medical research. Indo-US strategic
relations are now the strongest they have been in five decades.
Historically speaking, this new relationship is almost diametrically
opposite to what it has been. Over the past 50 years, India-US
interactions have been lukewarm at best and viewed with mutual
suspicion at worst. During the Cold War, the United States
was focused on containing the expansion of the Soviet Union
in the Middle East and Asia. India, while officially non-aligned
between the two superpowers, was clearly within the Soviet
orbit. In the 1970's, the U.S. tilted towards Pakistan and
became even closer to Islamabad after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Washington also entered into a tacit coalition
with Beijing against perceived Soviet threats in Northeast
Asia and in support of Pakistan and the Afghan resistance.
As a result of these policies, relations between the United
States and India became increasingly strained.
Today, however, the Cold War is over. The
USSR no longer exists. Russian troops have withdrawn from
Afghanistan and no longer menace Northeast Asia. Attention
in India and the U.S. has shifted to the advancement of economic
prosperity and democratic values. The events of the 1990s
should have seen a great warming of relations between the
United States and India, but American and Indian policymakers
and opinion elites have been slow to readjust their thinking.
And this must change if both countries want to develop a robust
relationship in order to capture the benefits of closer mutual
cooperation.
The United States now faces a new situation
in Asia, with a rising China posing a threat to America's
Pacific Rim allies and interests. The shared concern over
China in both the US and India is an important element in
this new closer strategic relationship. There is increasing
concern in several US policy quarters over the threat of China's
military modernization. Whether China is a strategic partner
or a strategic competitor is a question constantly being raised
in the US. From the India perspective, China's military improvements
and diplomatic overtures-including its modernization of naval
bases in Myanmar and its development of Pakistan's Gwadar
port, both of which could threaten India's vital sea lanes
and communications---have raised concerns in India about its
"encirclement". Beijing has also built major air
bases on the Tibet plateau, studded the mountains with sensors
that can see deep into Indian territory and deployed medium
range, nuclear missiles there as well. A network of military
roads have been built linking Tibet with the Chengdu military
region, while the Karakoram Highway links China with Pakistan,
skirting along the edge of Kashmir. Enough Han Chinese immigrants
have been moved into the province to render the native Tibetans
a minority. From the high ground of Tibet, China can not only
threaten India militarily, but also control the headwaters
of India's most important rivers, including the Ganges. Clearly,
both the US and India have questions about China's strategic
interests, and if China does indeed emerge as a major power,
the US and India can only benefit from a closer strategic
relationship. As the US and India continue to engage militarily,
their strategies will reflect their perceptions and thinking
of China's military potential and strategic ambitions. Clearly,
a viable long term strategic relationship between these two
democracies cannot be based only on China, nor can China be
the sole motivating force for this relationship. An enduring
strategic relationship goes well-beyond only such considerations;
China will, nevertheless, be an important factor in the formulation
of this relationship
For both the US and India, this relationship has immediate
implications since China is continuing to assist Pakistan
develop its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities
in ways that could de-stabilize the region. Moreover, the
revelations about Pakistan's support of North Korea's nuclear
program reveals a China-Pakistan-North Korea nexus that should
make strategic thinkers in the US and India think very hard
about what lies ahead in the future. The current stalemate
on the negotiations about North Korea's nuclear weapons program
is only one by-product of that nexus.
Furthermore, while a stable, democratic, economically viable
and terrorist - free Pakistan is clearly in the long-term
interest of both the US and India, the current friction over
Kashmir between India and Pakistan has the potential to seriously
destabilize the region with dire consequences. At the same
time, Pakistan's past involvement in Afghanistan directly
supported the creation of a radical fundamentalist Islamic
regime that sponsored the Al Qaeda and fueled terrorist violence
and subversion in other parts of Asia including Kashmir. After
the attack on the US on September 11, 2001, it has become
increasingly apparent that India and the US are natural allies
in the global war on terrorism. The migration of Al Qaeda
after the fall of the Taliban from Afghanistan into Pakistan
-- and most likely now into Kashmir -- threatens the national
security of both the US and India. While Pakistan has been
a helpful ally to the US in capturing some Al Qaeda leaders,
it has been less than successful, to put bit mildly, in restricting
cross-border terrorism into India as it has promised. Consequently,
there is increasing concern in the US that the Government
in Pakistan may be hunting with the hounds and running with
the hares. The realty, however, is that today, the US is balancing
its short-term interests in the war on terrorism with its
long-term strategic relationship with India and both, the
US and India will have to figure out a way to "square
this circle" if the Indo-US relationship is to mature.
Additionally, in the global war on terrorism,
the increasing light being shed on the funding of Islamist
extremism, both in the US and in India, posses a serious threat
to the internal stability of India and places the US on a
direct collision course with its long-time ally. Specifically,
the events of 9/11 and their aftermath have brought into focus
a critical area in which the United States and India face
similar threats and, therefore, have compatible interests.
The terrorist threats to the United States by Al Qaeda and
by Islamist terrorist groups to India are nearly a daily preoccupation.
What is less understood, but is no less serious, is the long-term
impact of the financing and encouragement of Islamist extremism
on the internal security of both countries. The spread of
Islamist extremism in either country could have dire consequences
for both and could threaten the stability and internal security
of India.
While India and the US are natural security
partners in many ways, what is less well - known in the US
is that India is also becoming an important security partner
with Israel. What unites all three countries is that all three
are threatened by Islamic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
Also, what is not well- known is that India was the very first
country to endorse President Bush's US missile defense program;
such defenses are an important mechanism to create uncertainty
about the effectiveness of first strikes-an option that Pakistan
has refused to take off the table, unlike India. As US Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Peter Rodman, said in June in Washington
DC, missile defense has the potential for great cooperation
between the two countries. The fact that the US and India
plan to hold a missile defense workshop by February 26, 2004,
the US approval of Israel's sale of the Phalcon air defense
system and the on-going discussions about the Arrow and Patriot
missile defense systems are all indications of increased cooperation
by these three countries in this vital area.
In the past, the official response from
Washington to Indian reactions to various events has been
to lecture India about its desire to build a nuclear deterrent
and to reprimand the country with economic sanctions. There
is also a bias in the American media towards blaming India
for problems with Pakistan over violence in Kashmir. This
has been exacerbated by many think tanks in the US that continue
to draw a moral equivalence between Pakistan and India. These
and other out-of-date perceptions that govern the relationship
(and there are many on the Indian side as well) obscure important
facts. For example, the U.S. is India's top trading partner;
the U.S. and India cooperate in space and scientific research;
and, as mentioned earlier, India and the U.S. hold joint military
exercises. Unfortunately, these vital areas of progress in
the Indo-U.S. relationship are virtually unknown not only
to average American and Indian, but even to many policy and
opinion leaders. The recriminations and ignorance that are
a Cold War legacy need to change for the sake of both the
United States and India.
Strategically, this cooperation makes eminent
sense for both countries. While the United States has formed
close ties with Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia and
with Australia in the South, it lacks strong ties with a major
power in Southwest Asia. From the US point of view, in the
geographical arc that runs from Japan to Israel-the two "bookend"
countries-lie China, North Korea, South Korea, the countries
of Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran. Of
all these countries, India is the only one that shares the
same value system as the US and has the potential to be a
major economic and military power in the 21st century. From
India's point of view, it can hardly hurt to develop increasingly
closer defense, security and economic relations with an increasingly
receptive US that also happens to be the world's only economic
and military super power for the foreseeable future. This
logic has prompted calls from Professor Nalapat for the creation
of the Asian equivalent of NATO-a formal values-based security
system for the Asia Pacific region in which India would play
a critical role and would include countries from the region
that share and would defend democratic values. India should
demonstrate confident leadership and engage the US in a dialogue
to form such a security alliance.
On the economic front, a few years ago,
India was identified by the U.S. as one of the 10 major emerging
markets. The two countries are presently establishing a new
and much closer trade and economic relationship which is expected
to strengthen significantly over time. The visits in 2000
and 2001 by the US President to India and by the Indian Prime
Minister to the US have underscored the importance that both
these countries place on strengthening their economic ties
with each other. India-US bilateral trade has been steadily
growing; though it still remains a small fraction of US's
global trade. Nevertheless, stronger economic links are being
forged every day. Almost every US IT firm has now established
a presence in India. The defense industries are now open to
foreign investments. And many Fortune 500 companies outsource
their requirements from India. Moreover, over the years, the
composition of US-India bilateral trade has been changing
and growing. In 2001, India's total exports to the US amounted
to almost $15 billion and imports from the US to about $4
billion. In 2002 US-India trade grew by another 22% and could
reach $30 billion this year (2003). And India has now become
the single most important exporter of diamonds, carpets, linens
and antibiotics, among others, to the US. Clearly, the potential
to increase this bilateral trade is very large.
India also remains a very large market for
US foreign investment. The most promising sectors include
infrastructure, communications and energy. Also, the size
and the potential for growth of the Indian domestic market
make it a very attractive country for the U.S. The rising
consumerism, the emergence of consumer finance and increases
in the number of households, headed by professionals, business
individuals and salary earners makes the Indian consumer market
very attractive. Many U.S. corporations in a variety of different
sectors are now active in India (e.g., General Electric, Whirlpool,
Ford, Pepco, IBM, Microsoft, Intel and Wal-Mart). There is
still great potential for cooperation in trade and commerce
and the U.S. has expressed strong interest in enhancing trade
and investment ties with India. India and the US are not only
allies in the cause for democracy, but both are now exploiting
new trade and economic ties that will bind these countries
closer together.
But if India wants to play major role on
the world stage as an economic powerhouse and be taken seriously,
it cannot remain sanguine about its current rate of economic
growth of 5-6 % p.a. While this is high by current world standards,
India has the potential to grow at twice that rate-10-12 %
p.a., if only it would unleash the dynamism and entrepreneurial
energies of its citizens. This would come as a rude awakening;
particularly to the Western world and make them take India
very seriously as India would burst onto to the world's economic
stage. Despite the recent economic reforms, the bureaucracy
still stifles economic growth, which is the single most important
factor in alleviating poverty. I would hope that the current
progress towards economic liberalization, privatization, and
deregulation would not only continue but would accelerate
even more. Unshackling the private sector should be the "mantra
of the day" and the resulting economic boom would become
the "glue" of an enduring US-India relationship
in all its strategic dimensions.
While great strides have been made by the
Bush and Vajpayee administrations in strengthening Indo-U.S.
relationships, there are still many obstacles. These include
differing perspectives of and approaches to Pakistan; nuclear
proliferation concerns by those who do not approve of India
as a nuclear power; and problematic economic issues. All of
these could derail this process. Many obstacles lie on both
sides. India has complained about US restrictions and export
controls that prevent the sales of advanced equipment. The
US has expressed concerns about the difficulty in working
with their Indian counterparts as being non-responsive and
describes the Indian bureaucracy as rigid and centralized.
To quote one senior Indian policy maker: "if the US is
willing to share dual- use technologies, then it suggests
that the US regards India as a partner that shares strategic
concerns and burdens. If the US denies access to dual-use
technology, then it gives the impression that India is not
accepted or trusted." But years of mistrust and mutual
suspicion will not evaporate overnight. And even as this strategic
relationship develops, there will inevitably be disagreements.
It will not be all smooth sailing. The critical issue will
not be the emergence of such disagreements, but rather how
they are managed. There are today many signs of progress,
as discussed earlier, and there is increasing willingness
in the US to allowing India access to high technology weapons.
India rightly wants an "adult to adult" relationship,
not a "parent-child" one. And obviously a meaningful
defense relationship will imply that India's defense equipment
will eventually have to be somewhat on par with that of the
US. Managing skillfully all the dimensions of this relationship,
with all its ups and downs -- and which is still in transition
-- is of critical importance to both countries. There is,
however, very little by way of a concerted and coordinated
effort to manage the strategic public diplomacy aspect of
this official relationship. The result is that critical opportunities
are being missed to educate policy makers and opinion leaders,
senior journalists and academics on both sides about what
underpins the pro-India thinking of the senior leadership
in the US and what can be done to enhance the ties between
these two democracies. Moreover, while economics was the locomotive
for a stronger US-India relationship in the late nineties,
today, much greater progress has been made on issues of defense
and national security, and economics has now become the weakest
link in this relationship. Economics can and must play a very
important role in bringing U.S. and India together; strengthening
the links between the financial and business communities of
the two countries will be critical to an enduring Indo - U.S.
relationship.
Given the tremendous mutual benefits that
could accrue to both countries from a robust relationship,
there needs to be an organized, systematic effort aimed at
bringing the positive benefits of a closer US-India relationship
to the attention of the American and Indian people, to their
elected leaders and to the media. This effort must also encompass
help and support, in the form of information, analyses, advice
and suggestion to policy and opinion makers in the U.S. and
India -- help them to "read the tea leaves" -- to
assist them to manage this critical relationship to maximize
the benefits to both nations. This conference is a step in
that direction. And to that end, we have created such a politically
independent, nonprofit, public policy institute to take advantage
of the current unique environment and gain a sound footing
under the active aegis of the current Administration.
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